Exposure Map

Of the 116,500 rsETH taken from the Kelp DAO bridge, 89,567 was deposited straight into Aave as collateral and borrowed against for $190M of WETH. Aave's contracts were never touched. Aave, SparkLend and Fluid all froze their rsETH markets; at least nine protocols were affected.

Proof of backing is measured on chain for wrapped and bridged assets: minted supply against verifiable backing, continuously. The moment supply outruns backing, every market holding that asset is downstream of a fact the graph already knows, and the look-through query answers who is exposed and for how much.

It takes more than one wall. The clearest case for the compounding argument. Ops Monitor sees the cause, Asset Ratings would have refused the structure, and Exposure Map tells the nine protocols downstream what it costs them.

Stream Finance disclosed a $93M loss and froze withdrawals. Elixir's deUSD had lent roughly sixty-five per cent of its backing to Stream through private lending vaults; it fell about ninety-eight per cent and was wound down. Some lending markets had hard-coded the affected collateral at a dollar, so positions could not be liquidated and the bad debt stayed invisible.

This is the look-through question. A deUSD holder held a claim on a loan to a fund manager, two steps removed, and the graph follows the chain of claims to the bottom rather than stopping at the wrapper. Where a price is an assumption rather than a measurement, the surface says so in the same type as the number.

The protocol priced an asset as the median of eleven sources, which reads as robust. Five of those eleven were Curve pools holding the same pair family, and one flash loan moved all five at once. The median followed, borrowing opened at a manipulated price.

Independence is a property of the graph, not of a count. Reading each source back to the venue state it derives from shows five of eleven collapsing to one dependency. Depth is measured from live venue state, so the cost of moving those pools is a number rather than an assumption.

A reentrancy lock that silently did nothing in three versions of the Vyper compiler let attackers drain several stable pools. The direct loss was not the dangerous part: Curve's founder had pledged roughly 427 to 460 million CRV, close to half the circulating supply, against more than $100M of debt across Aave, FraxLend, Abracadabra, Inverse and Silo.

The exposure at risk was a multiple of the amount stolen, and it sat on balance sheets belonging to protocols the exploit never touched. Contagion order answers which of those five markets becomes unhealthy first and at what price; exit depth answers what liquidating into the thinnest book of the year would cost.

The attacker used Alpha Homora's leveraged lending to borrow and lend repeatedly against Iron Bank, then walked away. Alpha Homora was the protocol with the flaw. Iron Bank was left holding the debt, and it had done nothing wrong at all.

Two protocols were coupled by a credit line most people reading either dashboard could not see. That coupling is an edge in the graph, carrying its source contract, chain, block and read time, so who is downstream of whom is answered from chain state rather than a vendor's feed.